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Essay
T
his essay makes the underlying 
assumption that scientific 
information is an economic 
commodity, and that scientific journals 
are a medium for its dissemination 
and exchange. While this exchange 
system differs from a conventional 
market in many senses, including 
the nature of payments, it shares the 
goal of transferring the commodity 
(knowledge) from its producers 
(scientists) to its consumers (other 
scientists, administrators, physicians, 
patients, and funding agencies). The 
function of this system has major 
consequences. Idealists may be 
offended that research be compared to 
widgets, but realists will acknowledge 
that journals generate revenue; 
publications are critical in drug 
development and marketing and to 
attract venture capital; and publishing 
defines successful scientific careers. 
Economic modelling of science may 
yield important insights (Table 1).
The Winner’s Curse
In auction theory, under certain 
conditions, the bidder who wins tends 
to have overpaid. Consider oil firms 
bidding for drilling rights; companies 
estimate the size of the reserves, and 
estimates differ across firms. The 
average of all the firms’ estimates would 
usually approximate the true reserve 
size. Since the firm with the highest 
estimate bids the most, the auction 
winner systematically overestimates, 
sometimes so substantially as to lose 
money in net terms [1]. When bidders 
are cognizant of the statistical processes 
of estimates and bids, they correct for 
the winner’s curse by shading their bids 
down. This is why experienced bidders 
sometimes avoid the curse, as opposed 
to inexperienced ones [1–4]. Yet in 
numerous studies, bidder behaviour 
appears consistent with the winner’s 
curse [5–8]. Indeed, the winner’s curse 
was first proposed by oil operations 
researchers after they had recognised 
aberrant results in their own market.
An analogy can be applied to 
scientific publications. As with 
individual bidders in an auction, 
the average result from multiple 
studies yields a reasonable estimate 
of a “true” relationship. However, 
the more extreme, spectacular 
results (the largest treatment 
effects, the strongest associations, 
or the most unusually novel and 
exciting biological stories) may be 
preferentially published. Journals 
serve as intermediaries and may suffer 
minimal immediate consequences for 
errors of over- or mis-estimation, but 
it is the consumers of these laboratory 
and clinical results (other expert 
scientists; trainees choosing fields 
of endeavour; physicians and their 
patients; funding agencies; the media) 
who are “cursed” if these results are 
severely exaggerated—overvalued 
and unrepresentative of the true 
outcomes of many similar experiments. 
For example, initial clinical studies 
are often unrepresentative and 
misleading. An empirical evaluation 
of the 49 most-cited papers on the 
effectiveness of medical interventions, 
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Summary
The current system of publication 
in biomedical research provides 
a distorted view of the reality of 
scientific data that are generated in the 
laboratory and clinic. This system can 
be studied by applying principles from 
the field of economics. The “winner’s 
curse,” a more general statement of 
publication bias, suggests that the 
small proportion of results chosen for 
publication are unrepresentative of 
scientists’ repeated samplings of the real 
world. The self-correcting mechanism 
in science is retarded by the extreme 
imbalance between the abundance 
of supply (the output of basic science 
laboratories and clinical investigations) 
and the increasingly limited venues for 
publication (journals with sufficiently 
high impact). This system would be 
expected intrinsically to lead to the 
misallocation of resources. The scarcity 
of available outlets is artificial, based on 
the costs of printing in an electronic age 
and a belief that selectivity is equivalent 
to quality. Science is subject to great 
uncertainty: we cannot be confident 
now which efforts will ultimately yield 
worthwhile achievements. However, 
the current system abdicates to a small 
number of intermediates an authoritative 
prescience to anticipate a highly 
unpredictable future. In considering 
society’s expectations and our own 
goals as scientists, we believe that there 
is a moral imperative to reconsider 
how scientific data are judged and 
disseminated.
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published in highly visible journals in 
1990–2004, showed that a quarter of 
the randomised trials and five of six 
non-randomised studies had already 
been contradicted or found to have 
been exaggerated by 2005 [9]. The 
delay between the reporting of an 
initial positive study and subsequent 
publication of concurrently performed 
but negative results is measured in 
years [10,11]. An important role of 
systematic reviews may be to correct 
the inflated effects present in the initial 
studies published in famous journals 
[12], but this process may be similarly 
prolonged and even systematic reviews 
may perpetuate inflated results [13,14]. 
More alarming is the general paucity 
in the literature of negative data. 
In some fields, almost all published 
studies show formally significant 
results so that statistical significance no 
longer appears discriminating [15,16]. 
Discovering selective reporting is not 
easy, but the implications are dire, as in 
the “hidden” results for antidepressant 
trials [17]: in a recent paper, it was 
shown that while almost all trials with 
“positive” results on antidepressants 
had been published, trials with 
“negative” results submitted to the 
US Food and Drug Administration, 
with few exceptions, remained either 
unpublished or were published with 
the results presented so that they would 
appear “positive” [17]. Negative or 
contradictory data may be discussed 
at conferences or among colleagues, 
but surface more publicly only when 
dominant paradigms are replaced. 
Sometimes, negative data do appear 
in refutation of prominent claims. 
In the “Proteus phenomenon”, an 
extreme result reported in the first 
published study is followed by an 
extreme opposite result; this sequence 
may cast doubt on the significance, 
meaning, or validity of any of the 
results [18]. Several factors may predict 
irreproducibility (small effects, small 
studies, “hot” fields, strong interests, 
large databases, flexible statistics) [19], 
but claiming that a specific study is 
wrong is a difficult, charged decision. 
In the basic biological sciences, 
statistical considerations are secondary 
or nonexistent, results entirely 
unpredicted by hypotheses are 
celebrated, and there are few formal 
rules for reproducibility  [20,21]. A 
signalling benefit from the market—
good scientists being identified by their 
positive results—may be more powerful 
in the basic biological sciences 
than in clinical research, where the 
consequences of incorrect assessment 
of positive results are more dire. As 
with clinical research, prominent 
claims sometimes disappear over time 
[21]. If a posteriori considerations are 
met sceptically in clinical research, in 
basic biology they dominate. Negative 
data are not necessarily different 
than positive results as related to 
considerations of experimental design, 
execution, or importance. Much data 
are never formally refuted in print, 
but most promising preclinical work 
eventually fails to translate to clinical 
benefit [22]. Worse, in the course of 
ongoing experimentation, apparently 
negative studies are abandoned 
prematurely as wasteful. 
Oligopoly
Successful publication may be more 
difficult at present than in the past. 
The supply and demand of scientific 
production have changed. Across the 
health and life sciences, the number of 
published articles in Scopus-indexed 
journals rose from 590,807 in 1997 
to 883,853 in 2007, a modest 50% 
increase. In the same decade, data 
acquisition has accelerated by many 
orders of magnitude: as an example, 
the current Cancer Genome Atlas 
project requires 10,000 times more 
sequencing effort than the Human 
Genome Project, but is expected to 
take a tenth of the time to complete 
[23]. In the current environment, 
the distinction between raw data 
and articles (telling for sure what 
more an article has compared with 
raw data) can sometimes become 
difficult. Only a small proportion of 
the explosively expanded output of 
biological laboratories appears in the 
modestly increased number of journal 
slots available for its publication, even 
Table 1. Economic Terms and Analogies in Scientific Publication
Economic Term Meaning Analogy in Scientific Publication 
Winner’s curse The winner in an auction tends on average to have overpaid, 
especially when no participant is sure exactly how valuable 
the item is. 
Scientific studies try to find true relationships, but none are 
certain of what these relationships are exactly. Published 
articles, especially in very competitive journals, have on 
average exaggerated results.
Oligopoly A market where a few traders have the major share and each 
oligopolist has significant power to influence the market.
Very few journals with limited publication slots (compared 
with geometrically increasing scientific data that seek 
publication) determine highly visible science.
Herding “Follow-the-leader” behaviour: the actions of the first or 
dominant player supersede the individual information and 
actions of all the players in a market.
Scientists may uncritically follow paths of investigation 
that are popularised in prestigious publications, neglecting 
novel ideas and truly independent investigative paths.
Artificial scarcity Restrictions on the provision of a commodity above that 
expected from its production cost.
Print page limits are an obvious excuse for failure to 
accept articles, and further the small number of major 
“high-impact” journals have limited slots; extremely low 
acceptance rates provide status signals to successful 
publications and their authors. 
Uncertainty Situation where the real long-term value of a commodity is 
largely unpredictable.
For much (most?) scientific work, it is difficult or impossible 
to immediately predict future value, extensions, and 
practical applications. 
Branding Marking a product as valuable; of key importance when it is 
difficult to determine a product’s value prior to consuming it.
Publishing in selective journals provides evidence of value 
of a research result and its authors, independent of the 
manuscript’s content.
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if more data can be compacted in the 
average paper now than in the past.
Constriction on the demand 
side is further exaggerated by the 
disproportionate prominence of a very 
few journals. Moreover, these journals 
strive to attract specific papers, such as 
influential trials that generate publicity 
and profitable reprint sales. This 
“winner-take-all” reward structure [24] 
leaves very little space for “successful 
publication” for the vast majority of 
scientific work and further exaggerates 
the winner’s curse. The acceptance rate 
decreases by 5.3% with doubling of 
circulation, and circulation rates differ 
by over 1,000-fold among 114 journals 
publishing clinical research [25]. For 
most published papers, “publication” 
often just signifies “final registration 
into oblivion”. Besides print circulation, 
in theory online journals should be 
readily visible, especially if open access. 
However, perhaps unjustifiably, most 
articles published in online journals 
remain rarely accessed. Only 73 of 
the many thousands of articles ever 
published by the 187 BMC-affiliated 
journals had over 10,000 accesses 
through their journal Web sites in the 
last year [26].
Impact factors are widely adopted as 
criteria for success, despite whatever 
qualms have been expressed [27–32]. 
They powerfully discriminate against 
submission to most journals, restricting 
acceptable outlets for publication. 
“Gaming” of impact factors is explicit. 
Editors make estimates of likely 
citations for submitted articles to 
gauge their interest in publication. 
The citation game  [33,34] has created 
distinct hierarchical relationships 
among journals in different fields. In 
scientific fields with many citations, 
very few leading journals concentrate 
the top-cited work [35]: in each of 
the seven large fields to which the life 
sciences are divided by ISI Essential 
Indicators (each including several 
hundreds of journals), six journals 
account for 68%–94% of the 100 
most-cited articles in the last decade 
(Clinical Medicine 83%, Immunology 
94%, Biochemistry and Biology 68%, 
Molecular Biology and Genetics 85%, 
Neurosciences 72%, Microbiology 76%, 
Pharmacology/Toxicology 72%). The 
scientific publishing industry is used for 
career advancement [36]: publication 
in specific journals provides scientists 
with a status signal. As with other 
luxury items intentionally kept in short 
supply, there is a motivation to restrict 
access [37,38].
Some unfavourable consequences 
may be predicted and some are 
visible. Resource allocation has long 
been recognised by economists as 
problematic in science, especially in 
basic research where the risks are the 
greatest. Rival teams undertake unduly 
dubious and overly similar projects; and 
too many are attracted to one particular 
contest to the neglect of other areas, 
reducing the diversity of areas under 
exploration [39]. Early decisions by 
a few influential individuals as to the 
importance of an area of investigation 
consolidate path dependency: the 
first decision predetermines the 
trajectory. A related effect is herding, 
where the actions of a few prominent 
individuals rather than the cumulative 
input of many independent agents 
drives people’s valuations of a 
commodity  [40,41]. Cascades arise 
when individuals regard others’ earlier 
actions as more informative than their 
own private information. The actions 
upon which people herd may not 
necessarily be correct; and herding 
may long continue upon a completely 
wrong path [41]. Information cascades 
encourage conventional behaviour, 
suppress information aggregation, 
and promote “bubble and bust” cycles. 
Informational analysis of the literature 
on molecular interactions in Drosophila
genetics has suggested the existence of 
such information cascades, with positive 
momentum, interdependence among 
published papers (most reporting 
positive data), and dominant themes 
leading to stagnating conformism [42]. 
Artificial Scarcity
The authority of journals increasingly 
derives from their selectivity. The venue 
of publication provides a valuable 
status signal. A common excuse for 
rejection is selectivity based on a 
limitation ironically irrelevant in the 
modern age—printed page space. This 
is essentially an example of artificial 
scarcity. Artificial scarcity refers to 
any situation where, even though 
a commodity exists in abundance, 
restrictions of access, distribution, or 
availability make it seem rare, and thus 
overpriced. Low acceptance rates create 
an illusion of exclusivity based on merit 
and more frenzied competition among 
scientists “selling” manuscripts. 
Manuscripts are assessed with a 
fundamentally negative bias: how they 
may best be rejected to promote the 
presumed selectivity of the journal. 
Journals closely track and advertise 
their low acceptance rates, equating 
these with rigorous review: “Nature
has space to publish only 10% or so 
of the 170 papers submitted each 
week, hence its selection criteria are 
rigorous”—even though it admits that 
peer review has a secondary role: “the 
judgement about which papers will 
interest a broad readership is made by 
Nature’s editors, not its referees” [43]. 
Science also equates “high standards of 
peer review and editorial quality” with 
the fact that “of the more than 12,000 
top-notch scientific manuscripts that 
the journal sees each year, less than 8% 
are accepted for publication” [44]. 
The publication system may operate 
differently in different fields. For 
example, for drug trials, journal 
operations may be dominated by the 
interests of larger markets: the high 
volume of transactions involved extends 
well beyond the small circle of scientific 
valuations and interests. In other 
fields where no additional markets 
are involved (the history of science is 
perhaps one extreme example), the 
situation of course may be different. 
The question to be examined is 
whether published data may be more 
representative (and more unbiased) 
depending on factors such as the ratio 
of journal outlets to amount of data 
generated, the relative valuation of 
specialty journals, career consequences 
of publication, and accessibility of 
primary data to the reader.
One solution to artificial scarcity—
digital publication—is obvious and 
already employed. Digital platforms 
can facilitate the publication of greater 
numbers of appropriately peer-
reviewed manuscripts with reasonable 
hypotheses and sound methods. 
Digitally formatted publication need 
not be limited to few journals, or only 
to open-access journals. Ideally, all 
journals could publish in digital form 
manuscripts that they have received 
and reviewed and that they consider 
unsuitable for print publication 
based on subjective assessments of 
priority. The current privileging of 
print over digital publication by some 
authors and review committees may 
be reversed, if online-only papers 
can be demonstrated or perceived to PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1421 October 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 10  |  e201
represent equal or better scientific 
reality than conventional printed 
manuscripts.
Uncertainty
When scientific information itself is 
the commodity, there is uncertainty as 
to its value, both immediately and in 
the long term. Usually we do not know 
what information will be most useful 
(valuable) eventually. Economists 
have struggled with these peculiar 
attributes of scientific information as 
a commodity. Production of scientific 
information is largely paid for by public 
investment, but the product is offered 
free to commercial intermediaries, 
and is culled by them with minimal 
cost, for sale back to the producers and 
their underwriters! An explanation 
for such a strange arrangement is 
the need for branding—marking the 
product as valuable. Branding may be 
more important when a commodity 
cannot easily be assigned much 
intrinsic value and when we fear the 
exchange environment will be flooded 
with an overabundance of redundant, 
useless, and misleading product 
[39,45]. Branding serves a similar 
and complementary function to the 
status signal for scientists discussed 
above. While it is easy to blame journal 
editors, the industry, or the popular 
press, there is scant evidence that 
these actors bear the major culpability 
[46–49]. Probably authors themselves 
self-select their work for branding 
[10,11,50–52].
Conclusions
We may consider several competing 
or complementary options about the 
future of scientific publication (Box 1). 
When economists are asked to analyse 
a resource-allocation system, a typical 
assumption is that when information 
is dispersed, over time, the individual 
actors will not make systematic errors 
in their inferences. However, not all 
economists accept this strong version of 
rationality. Systematic misperceptions 
in human behaviour occur with some 
frequency [53], and misperceptions 
can perpetuate ineffective systems.
Some may accept the current 
publication system as the ideal 
culmination of an evolutionary 
process. However, this order is hardly 
divinely inspired; additionally, the 
larger environment has changed over 
time. Can digital publication alleviate 
wasteful efforts of repetitive submission, 
review, revision, and resubmission? 
Preferred publication of negative over 
positive results has been suggested, 
with print publication favoured for 
all negative data (as more likely to be 
true) and for only a minority of the 
positive results that have demonstrated 
consistency and reproducibility [54]. 
To exorcise the winner’s curse, the 
quality of experiments rather than 
the seemingly dramatic results in a 
minority of them would be the focus of 
review, but is this feasible in the current 
reality?
There are limitations to our analysis. 
Compared with the importance 
of the problem, there is a relative 
paucity of empirical observations on 
the process of scientific publication. 
The winner’s curse is fundamental to 
our thesis, but there is active debate 
among economists whether it inhibits 
real environments or is more of a 
theoretical phenomenon [1,8]. Do 
senior investigators make the same 
adjustments on a high-profile paper’s 
value as do experienced traders on 
prices? Is herding an appropriate 
model for scientific publication? Can 
we correlate the site of publication 
with the long-term value of individual 
scientific work and of whole areas of 
investigation? These questions remain 
open to analysis and experiment.
Even though its goals may sometimes 
be usurped for other purposes, science 
is hard work with limited rewards 
and only occasional successes. Its 
interest and importance should speak 
for themselves, without hyperbole. 
Uncertainty is powerful and yet quite 
insufficiently acknowledged when we 
pretend prescience to guess at the 
ultimate value of today’s endeavours. 
If “the striving for knowledge and the 
search for truth are still the strongest 
motives of scientific discovery”, and if 
“the advance of science depends upon 
the free competition of thought” [55], 
we must ask whether we have created 
a system for the exchange of scientific 
ideas that will serve this end.  
Supporting Information
Text S1.
An extended version of this analytical essay
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.
pmed.0050201.sd001 (115 KB PDF).
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